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Abstract—The article proposes a log analysis approach to de-
tection of security violations, based on a four layer design.
First layer, named the event source layer, describes sources of
information that can be used for misuse investigation. Trans-
port layer represents the method of collecting event data, pre-
serving it in the form of logs and passing it to another layer,
called the analysis layer. This third layer is responsible for
analyzing the logs’ content, picking relevant information and
generating security alerts. Last layer, called normalization
layer, is custom software which normalizes and correlates pro-
duced alerts to raise notice on more complex attacks. Logs
from remote hosts are collected by using rsyslog software and
OSSEC HIDS with custom decoders and rules is used on a cen-
tral log server for log analysis. A novel method of handling
OSSEC HIDS alerts by their normalization and correlation is
proposed. The output can be optionally suppressed to pro-
tect the system against alarm flood and reduce the count of
messages transmitted in the network.
Keywords—HIDS, log analysis, NIDS, syslog.
1. Introduction
Events occurring in the operating system, like software in-
stallation, managing system services, as well as successful
and failed login attempts, are preserved real-time in the
form of logs. Every log stores data regarding its origin,
priority and time of appearance, which allows use of event
logs as a reliable source of information when building sys-
tems for alerting about security violations. Raising alarm
after detecting every single malfunction would lead to fre-
quent false positives. That is why receiving and correlating
data from multiple event log sources would increase accu-
racy of detection and allow to reveal violations with more
complex indicators.
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Fig. 1. Multilayered event log processing.
The design of the log-based system for detecting security
violations consists of four layers, presented in Fig. 1.
The bottom layer, named event source, specifies the log
sources in Linux and network environment relevant in the
process of detecting events. The essential information may
originate from typical system services and network devices,
as well as from security dedicated services like audit and
integrity check tools.
Transport layer is responsible for collecting log messages
from various sources and passing them to the log-col-
lecting server, where the analysis is done. The transport
must guarantee confidentiality and transmitted data in-
tegrity, achieved by using rsyslog software [1]. This layer
secures a copy of all incoming logs (crucial in security log
management according to the guidelines [2]), which en-
ables discovery of data tampering attempts. Preserving logs
in remote localization enables incident reconstruction even
after unrecoverable machine failure [3]. Moreover, pre-
serving three timestamps for every log (generation, server
reception, database insert) can indicate server downtime or
communication disruption, which can be relevant for fur-
ther investigation.
The role of the analysis layer is to generate alerts based
on incoming log entries by decoding key information and
filtering events that are relevant, while detecting malicious
behavior in the network. The first analysis is executed by
OSSEC HIDS [4] engine with a set of custom-written de-
coders and rules.
The need to decrease the number of repetitive alerts was
widely discussed in [5], [6] and some of the existing strate-
gies of alarm suppression were presented in [7]. The nor-
malization layer, implemented by dedicated software,
examines the output of the analysis layer and suppresses
excess alerts. The need to combine many sources of infor-
mation expressed in [8] is satisfied by performing nonlinear
correlation to detect more complex attacks. As a result, this
layer creates alarms that are normalized to a protocol, and
can be used by security system consumer.
2. Event Source Layer
2.1. Log Sources
Log messages containing knowledge about events taking
place in the operating system or the network can be ob-
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tained from various process sources. There are several
services and modules that gather information about se-
curity events and store it in the form of logs, shown in
Fig. 2. This article focuses on events generated by follow-
ing sources:
• auditd,
• Advanced Intrusion Detection Environment (AIDE),
• sshd,
• OSSEC rootcheck,
• racoon,
• iptables,
• network devices,
• event logs coming from dedicated processes related
with the system’s security.
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Fig. 2. Event sources.
auditd [9] is based on pre-configured rules and generates
log entries recording a large variety of information about
the events occurring in the system. According to [10],
auditd can discover policy violations by monitoring file ac-
tivities and collecting system calls.
AIDE [11] is a file and directory integrity checker. It
creates a database from the state of the system, register
hashes, modification times, etc. This database is later used
to verify the integrity of files by comparing it against the
real status of the system. All of the usual file attributes
can also be checked for inconsistencies. AIDE generates
syscall ANOM RBAC INTEGRITY FAIL, when change in
the monitored file structure is detected and received by au-
ditd from kernel.
sshd [12] is an OpenSSH Daemon, which provides secure
encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts
over an insecure network. It can refer to Pluggable Au-
thentication Modules (PAMs) [13], which provide a com-
mon authentication framework for applications and services
in a Linux system. The errors in communication can be
a valuable source for log analysis.
OSSEC’s rootcheck is an OSSEC HIDS module for rootkit
detection, which runs at regular intervals querying the sys-
tem for information and comparing the results with a list
of known rootkits and trojans. When the rootcheck module
finds discrepancies in information about a file, a process,
port or network interface, it will raise an alert about a sus-
pected rootkit.
racoon [14] is an Internet Key Exchange (IKE) daemon for
automatically keying IPsec connections to establish safe as-
sociations between hosts. Reported errors in communica-
tion can be used to detect suspicious behavior of nodes.
iptables [15] is used as a firewall to set up, maintain, and
inspect the tables of IP packet filter rules in the Linux
kernel.
Network devices (i.e., routers, switches, firewalls) send in-
formation about their activity in UDP messages.
2.2. Log Formats
Log records are an essential source of information and
can be written by a process to a dedicated text file, al-
though the majority of logs are a product of sending data
to local /dev/log socket, from where the messages are re-
ceived by a log collecting service called syslog. All infor-
mation collected by syslog should by written in a simple
syslog format described in RFC 5424 [16] with a such
structure:
<PRI> TIMESTAMP HOSTNAME APP-NAME: MSG
The value of the PRI part is assigned based on two proper-
ties, which are severity and facility. Severity is a numerical
value of event priority and varies from 0 (emergency) to 7
(debug). Facility value depends on the log supplier, where
different kinds of system services have taken their own
codes, e.g., kernel messages (kern) have 0 facility value,
authentication events (auth) have facility value equal to 4,
etc. In addition, every log contains the timestamp of the
logged event, hostname of the machine which produced the
message, program source of the event (optionally with PID
in brackets) and message content of registered log.
An example of a syslog protocol log is shown below:
Jul 7 14:37:10 pl.bipse.wil.si.kbk1
sshd[15308]: Accepted password for root from
192.168.56.1 port 56440 ssh2
Audit has an independent log processing system, which
writes events to /var/log/audit/audit.log file and also pro-
vides a rotation mechanism for its journals. However, with
the usage of audisp daemon the audit output can be redi-
rected to the standard /dev/log socket for further process-
ing. The audit log contains information about the type of
registered event (system call, login information, etc.), its
timestamp and a list of audit event fields suitable for given
occurrence.
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The example of audit log is as follows:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1441374914.091:1975):
arch=c000003e syscall=82 success=yes
exit=0 a0=1668900 a1=4a4fa8 a2=1647c00
a3=6d617473656d6974 items=5 ppid=1 pid=1840
auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0
fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none)
ses=4294967295 comm=“NetworkManager”
exe=“/usr/sbin/NetworkManager” key=“LINKING”
3. Transport Layer
3.1. Open Source Systems for Log Processing
A mechanism for centralized logging can be set up by con-
figuring existing open source solutions for log processing.
The leading software utilities are syslog-ng Open Source
Edition, developed by BalaBit IT Security Ltd.[17] and
rsyslog from Rainer Gerhards and Adiscon.
The syslog implementation used in a security system should
meet the requirements described in [18], such as high avail-
ability of service and confidentiality and integrity of trans-
mitted data. Both of the chosen solutions fulfill these as-
sumptions and offer the ability to send and collect remote
log messages by encrypted transmission using the Trans-
port Layer Security (TLS) mechanism. Another key feature
that both rsyslog and syslog-ng provide is database sup-
port. In addition, syslog-ng represents a highly customiz-
able solution that can gather information from many dif-
ferent sources beside the standard operating system events,
e.g. additional text files and the content of binary files such
as /var/log/btmp, which contains records of failed user login
attempts). The syslog-ng’s database support is flexible and
allows storing logs in daily tables without additional admin-
istrational procedures. The main disadvantage of syslog-ng
is its fix-sized queue mechanism, which does not guaran-
tee avoiding log loss during server unavailability in case of
client’s queue overflow.
On the other hand, rsyslog is capable of collecting standard
system messages and events written to external text files
and transferring them via Reliable Event Logging Protocol
(RELP) to the central log server, ensuring zero message
loss among the network nodes. rsyslog also supports disk
buffers for not forwarded log messages, which protects log
journals from loss and inconsistency.
For the purposes of the designed system rsyslog was cho-
sen to create the centralized log processing system due to
the reliability of its built-in mechanisms for log transfer
between the hosts.
3.2. Proposed Architecture of the Transport Layer
The transport layer is based on client-server architecture.
On every client machine data is collected from typical
sources, such as the /dev/log socket (including the out-
put of audispd redirecting audit events), system services
like AIDE or sshd. Moreover, clients can gather informa-
tion from network devices by receiving UDP messages
and passing the relevant data further. Collected informa-
tion is sent to the log server via the RELP communication,
which guarantees no message loss. RELP mechanism uses
a Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection, which
is an advantage over plain syslog communication, which
uses User Datagram Protocol (UDP) as a default.
The server machine receives messages from remote clients
and processes them next to the logs from the local sources
described above. Remote logs are written to separate files
in catalogues named after client’s hostnames, reflecting the
file structure on origin machine. The copy of all messages
is sent to the database, from where logs can easily be ac-
cessed with SQL queries. The database output stores all in-
formation included in the log, server receive timestamp and
database insert time as well. The rsyslog, based on proper-
ties from syslog header, filters messages and forwards them
to the named pipe /dev/ossec, from where they are received
by OSSEC HIDS analyzer. The flow of information in the
system is displayed in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3. Event log flow.
4. Analysis Layer
OSSEC HIDS is a platform to monitor the status of net-
work elements. It offers the functionality of Host Intrusion
Detection System (HIDS), Security Information and Event
Management (SIEM), log monitoring, rootkit detection and
checking the integrity of system files. It is frequently used
as a part of more complex security systems, due to its flex-
ibility and facility in adapting to own needs [19], [20]. In
the proposed architecture OSSEC HIDS with custom rules
and decoders is used to build a real-time log analyst moni-
tor. This approach enables correlation of events from every
node in the network. The stages of the analyst process are
shown in Fig. 4.
Process steps are as follows:
• Pre-decoding – as mentioned, rsyslog is used as
a transport channel for logs, which adds a syslog
header. This step decodes the syslog format and pulls
information about hostname and time from log;
• Decoding – custom decoders extract information
based on program name, relevant for event type. It
detects data like login name, address and ports for
source and destination;
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Fig. 4. OSSEC HIDS flow.
• Signatures and alerting – a set of custom rules is
matched to the log event. Composite rules correlate
hostnames, IPs, users etc. Every rule has an assigned
priority level. When a single event matches more
than one rule, the generated alarm has the priority
of the rule with the highest level or with the level
of the first matched rule when levels have the same
value. If the incident violates adopted policies, an
alarm is raised. Generated alarms precisely define
the detected security events.
4.1. Pre-decoding
OSSEC HIDS recognizes different log formats. In the pro-
posed system, the most common syslog format is used.
Based on the syslog format, specified fields are decoded,
such as:
• hostname – DNS/IP address of component which
originated the event,
• time – time of the event from the element,
• message – message which is used in analysis,
• program – information which process generated the
event.
Table 1 shows the result of the pre-decoding of a sample
log.
Table 1
The result of the pre-decoding of a sample log
Time Jul 17 08:34:40
Hostname pl.bipse.nask.element2
Program sshd[19721]:
Message
Accepted keyboard-interactive/pam for
root from 192.168.56.1 port 51499 ssh2
4.2. Decoding
Based on the results of pre-decoding, the field named pro-
gram determines the process from which the log comes.
This approach minimizes the number of decoding attempts
from the various decoders to only those that meet the cri-
teria. The matching decoder will later be used to decode
relevant information, for example the source IP address of
the user. The decoding process consists of three stages:
• decoder selection,
• log content matching using regular expressions,
• decoding declared fields.
Example of decoding an sshd log is shown in Fig. 5. Based
on process name sshd, the sshd decoder is used in the first
stage. This decoder has a set of sub-decoders, that are
used in regular expressions matching to determine which
of them can decode specific field. It is possible to use sev-
eral decoders simultaneously. Figure shows that the sshd-
success decoder has been selected. The last stage presents
that fields root and IP address were chosen and decoded
as USER and SRCIP (names of fields used in the inner
OSSEC HIDS logic).
1
2
3
Jul 17 08:34:40 pl.bipse.nask.element2 sshd[19721]
sshd PAM
Accepted keyboard-interactive/pam for root from 192.168.56.1
port 51499 ssh2
sshd-success ssh-denied
Accepted keyboard-interactive/pam for root from 192.168.56.1
port 51499 ssh2
USER SRCIP
Fig. 5. OSSEC HIDS decoding process.
4.3. Event Correlation and Signatures
OSSEC HIDS distinguishes two categories of rules that
generate alarms:
• atomic – based on a single event which occurred in
the system,
• composite – correlated over time, based on patterns
of other logs.
Figure 6 shows the logic of matching a rule to a decoded
event. Log entries are analyzed in a sub-rule only after
matching its parent rule. This approach accelerates the
process of analysis and minimizes the tested rules amount.
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Fig. 6. OSSEC HIDS rules match.
Pessimistic number of rules to process is the sum of all
parent type rules.
In the proposed solution the grouping of rules is a base for
event correlation. For example, events coming from two
different sources are decoded by two separate decoders and
getting in two independent branches of rules. However,
those rules have the same group id. While appearing in-
dividually none of the detected events generate alarms, but
their correlation leads to signs of an incident being detected
and raises an alarm. The grouping logic based on decoders
sshd and login is shown in Fig. 7.
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No alert
sshd log login log
sshd login
110001 101002
authentication_failed
110016
Decoding
Signatures
Group
Correlation signatures
Fig. 7. OSSEC HIDS correlation and grouping logic.
4.4. Proposed Abuse Detection
Custom rules and decoders allow detection of events, which
can be categorized into groups of security violation alarms
like:
• file modification – files that are watched by auditd or
AIDE, mostly configuration files of system or secu-
rity processes,
• authentication abuse – local or remote, based on login
and sshd proccess,
• rejected connection attempts – system firewall reports
about rejected connection attempts, this information
can be grouped and detected as a host scan,
• successful system user login – for example user
apache or mysql,
• malfunctions services – for example, possible error
of racoon negotiation between elements or invalidity
of certificates,
• file system and hardware errors – can cause unno-
ticed relevant events in system, like overflow of hard
drives,
• sudo abuse – system user and group modification,
• occurrence of unknown errors – events which should
draw attention of the operators, those can be symp-
toms of attacks or reconnaissance,
• network equipment errors and events – errors and
changes in the network topology are crucial informa-
tion about inappropriate network activity for further
investigation.
5. Normalization Layer
Previous layers process relevant event logs that can pos-
sibly generate alarms. This layer adds extra functionality,
which makes events more useful and foolproof. This is per-
formed by custom-written software. Main objectives of this
layer are:
• alarm suppression,
• normalization for other security systems,
• guaranteed delivery,
• nonlinear correlation,
• rejection of irrelevant alarms.
5.1. Alarm Suppression
In the proposed solution OSSEC HIDS can aggregate and
correlate events. Such aggregation can easily generate too
many alerts if events incoming in a short time are a huge
number of identical logs. As OSSEC HIDS suppresses
identical logs, this layer suppresses OSSEC HIDS iden-
tical alarms. Each subsequent alarm which is propagated,
contains the number of events summed in the suppression,
so that the number of individual events is not lost. Sup-
pression affects only the repeating alarms. The suppression
time is configurable, depending on the type of event to
which it refers to. This process is shown in Fig. 8. The pro-
posed approach minimizes the amount of identical alarms
sent and processed by central alarm analyzer, which re-
sults in improvement of performance without losing any
information.
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Fig. 8. OSSEC HIDS alarm suppression.
5.2. Normalization for Security System Protocol
Security systems often use their own protocols to com-
municate between components. Additionally, redundant
information generates unnecessary network traffic, which
can lead to internal Denial of Service (DoS) of security
systems. Triggered alarms must be standardized to meet
the needs accepted as a norm for reporting security inci-
dents. Adopted policy may require additional data. At this
point, the normalization layer enriches the message with
additional data based on the configuration or correlating
this event with information from knowledge bases. This is
shown in Fig. 9.
OSSEC alert
OSSEC alert
OSSEC alert JSON
JSON
JSON
File Knowledge
base
Processing
Normalized data
Extra data
Protocol header
Normalized alarm
Fig. 9. Normalization for other security systems.
5.3. Guaranteed Delivery
Ability to communicate with another component that is
a consumer of alerts requires normalization of forwarded
information. The second step is to ensure that the detected
event has been received by the central processing system.
Each of the outgoing events has an identifier of an inci-
dent and its time validity. The mechanism checks whether
the consumer has sent a reception acknowledgment or the
validity of the message has expired. Based on this feed-
back information, it is possible to send a message again
and guarantee delivery.
5.4. Nonlinear Correlation
The normalization layer adds a second correlation that can
combine facts from various areas of events. This layer, by
focusing on brokering, is able to expand the analysis based
on the rules of event occurrence. This can provide his-
torical events analysis and detection of patterns in alarms
based on concept of states. Combining the facts of unde-
sirable incidents occurring in various parts of the network
and applying security modeling, could result in producing
security rules that may protect other nodes, which are not
endangered yet.
5.5. Rejection of Irrelevant Alarms
The normalization layer adds the ability for the complex se-
curity system to work in various modes, which may require
additional alarm suppression. To reject alarms that are ir-
relevant, when system’s state is taken into consideration,
following modes can be distinguished:
• learning mode – detected incidents are a base for
rule creation, which will preserve similar events from
propagating in normal mode,
• reconfiguration mode – alarms are temporarily sup-
pressed when the system is under configuration and
modifications could result in false-positives,
• normal mode – every event classified as an alarm is
propagated further, unless there was a corresponding
rule created in the learning mode.
6. Summary
The article presented a multilayered approach to managing
and handling security incidents based on event logs. Each
layer presented key aspects of its functioning with examples
of implementation. Use of ready-made solutions allows
to focus attention on upper layers associated with event
processing logic. The division of responsibilities into layers
allows easier modification and implementation as part of
security systems.
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